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Chapter Eight
In Defense of 
Third-Party Forgiveness
Alice MacLachlan
In March 2007, the popular American public radio show This American Life 
aired an episode that included “Redemption by Proxy,”1 the true story of 
three people: Sophia, a high school teacher; Robert, her former, exceedingly 
troubled, student; and Lilly, his best friend. Robert rebelled, and Sophia came 
down too hard on him, keeping him after school, punishing him daily, and 
barring him from school events. Robert failed to graduate, he fell into violent 
company, and a year later he was shot and killed. Many of his friends blamed 
his teacher Sophia for his downfall; his friend Lilly was among them. Sophia 
herself “felt bad for not reaching him, bad for having been so hard on him” 
even before he was shot, and had guilty dreams of being confronted by his 
former classmates. She held herself partly culpable for Robert’s downward 
trajectory. Then one day, Lilly came to Sophia’s classroom and handed her a 
note. She called it a “letter of appreciation” from Robert but Lilly herself had 
written the note, which recounted her past conversations with Robert. After 
he failed to graduate, the note explained, only Lilly had remained angry. Rob-
ert had experienced a change in attitude. Despite everything, he came to feel 
grateful because Sophia had cared enough to hold him accountable, and that 
gratitude provided a context in which to understand her punishment of him. 
Interestingly, Lilly’s motives for the note focused on her relationship to—and 
care for—Robert: she wanted to redeem his reputation, even posthumously, 
to prove that he was someone who understood his responsibilities even if he 
couldn’t meet them, and to express the attitudes he had not. What she had 
not expected was the note’s profound effect on Sophia: Sophia kept the note 
in her wallet from then on, feeling that it “lifted away years of guilt.” In the 
podcast, the relief in her voice was palpable.
Many contemporary philosophers would agree that this is a moving story, 
but few would easily accept it as a story of forgiveness. Their objection might 
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go something like this: however much Sophia might crave and deserve for-
giveness, and however much Lilly might well have intended to offer it to her, 
Lilly can never forgive Sophia for something Sophia did to Robert. Robert 
was the victim of Sophia’s blameworthy actions, so only Robert can forgive 
Sophia. In the oft-quoted words of John Dryden, “forgiveness to the injured 
doth belong.”2 In this chapter, I will take issue with the philosophical posi-
tion that many have interpreted Dryden’s line to express: namely, that only 
victims of wrongdoing are in a position to forgive.
This chapter offers both a defense and a philosophical account of third-
party forgiveness.3 Most people agree that there are situations in which third 
parties (individuals other than the victim or perpetrator of a wrong) find 
themselves called upon to make conciliatory gestures or to adopt and express 
attitudes we would ordinarily describe as forgiving were they articulated by 
a victim.4 Furthermore, these third-party actions can potentially fulfill some 
of the same moral functions as forgiveness: repairing relationships damaged 
by wrongdoing, releasing repentant wrongdoers from self-recrimination and 
guilt and thus relieving excessive suffering, and expressing values of recon-
ciliation. They may even function to support the victim’s own healing.
I argue that we make best sense of both the nature and the value of such 
acts if we are willing to go further and recognize them as third-party forgive-
ness, a variant of forgiveness that is related but not reducible to victim’s for-
giveness. When we deny the conceptual possibility and potential moral value 
of acts of forgiveness performed by those other than the victim of wrongdo-
ing, we subscribe to a hyperindividualized account of wrongdoing that risks 
overmoralizing the victim’s position and ignoring the complex, distinct roles 
played by third parties, including witnesses, bystanders, and secondary par-
ticipants. Third-party forgiveness is not necessarily good, wise, or appropri-
ate forgiveness, any more than all acts of victim’s forgiveness are—indeed, 
there are heightened moral risks and concerns associated with it. Yet these 
risks do not negate its possible contributions to ongoing moral repair. When 
we deny the possibility of third-party forgiveness, we limit our understanding 
of the role such forgiveness can play—for better or for worse—in complex 
circumstances of multiple, mutual wrongdoings and hostility. Finally, in ac-
knowledging the possibility of third-party forgiveness, I claim, we can better 
and more subtly assess morally problematic instances.
My defense takes the following form. First, I briefly discuss what it means 
for one person—any person—to forgive another. Second, I develop what 
it would mean to forgive as a third party by asking what—if not sheer vic-
timization—gives one person the standing to forgive another.5 Rather than 
arguing for universal forgiveness, I suggest that legitimate acts of third-party 
forgiveness are grounded both in an appropriate external relation between 
the forgiver and a primary actor (victim or perpetrator) and in the would-be 
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forgiver’s empathetic engagement with the appropriate perspectives. I then 
consider how this account holds up against standard moral and conceptual 
objections to third-party forgiveness, and conclude with some remarks on 
the relationship between third-party forgiveness and victim’s forgiveness. 
Throughout my discussion, I draw on two narratives: the story of Sophia, 
Robert, and Lilly, described earlier, and the fictional story of Eva Katchadou-
rian and her difficult, ultimately murderous son Kevin, from Lionel Shriver’s 
disturbing novel We Need to Talk About Kevin.6
WHAT DO WE DO WHEN WE FORGIVE?
We Need to Talk About Kevin is a harrowing exploration of the limits of 
forgiveness. Written as a series of letters, the novel narrates the fraught 
relationship between Eva Katchadourian and her son Kevin, an indecipher-
able and malevolent child who grows up to commit a vicious mass murder 
at his high school, not unlike the real-life murders that plagued Columbine 
and other American cities in recent decades. Throughout her correspon-
dence, Eva agonizes over a guilty secret: she never liked her son very much, 
and she did not want to be a mother in the first place. They conducted a 
cold, often vicious, sometimes violent battle of wills throughout his child-
hood. While Eva is not responsible for her son’s action in a strict sense of 
the word, at times her self-condemnation seems extremely well placed. Not 
surprisingly, Eva’s letters return several times to the nature of forgiveness: 
as something she wants—or does not want—from the parents of her son’s 
victims, as something she feels unable to offer to her son, and as something 
she does not understand.
I am not sure what “forgiving” Kevin entails. Surely, it doesn’t involve sweep-
ing Thursday artificially under the carpet or ceasing to hold him accountable, 
which couldn’t be in his larger moral interests. I cannot imagine that I’m sup-
posed to get over it, like hopping over a low stone wall; if Thursday was a bar-
rier of some kind, it was made of razor wire. . . . I cannot pretend he didn’t do it, 
I cannot pretend I don’t wish he hadn’t, and if I have abandoned that felicitous 
parallel universe . . . the relinquishment of my private if-only derives more from 
a depleted imagination than any healthy reconcilement for what’s done is done. 
Honestly, when Carol Reeves formally “forgave” our son on CNN for murder-
ing her boy, Jeffrey, who was already precocious enough at the classical guitar 
to be courted by Julliard, I had no idea what she was talking about. Had she built 
a box around Kevin in her head, knowing that only rage dwelled there; was our 
son now simply a place her mind refused to go? At best, I reasoned that she had 
successfully depersonalized him into a regrettable natural phenomenon that had 
descended on her family like a hurricane.7
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Eva is not alone here. Contemporary philosophers also struggle over the 
precise nature of forgiveness.8 In everyday English, to describe one person 
as having forgiven another might mean to say that he or she was no longer 
angry with him or her or that he or she had changed his or her opinion of his 
or her or attitude toward him or her (coming to see him or her as reformed, 
improved, potentially improved, or worthy of a second chance), or that he or 
she had accepted his or her apology, that he or she had chosen not to revenge 
him- or herself, that he or she initiated a reconciliation. This list is not exhaus-
tive, only characteristic.
How can philosophers make sense of these permutations?9 There are a 
couple of options available: one might take the examples listed above to 
represent a cumulative set of necessary conditions. Someone forgives when 
he or she manages to do all these things; that is, when he or she stops being 
angry and appropriately adjusts his or her perception of the wrongdoer and 
accepts his or her apology, and so on. This makes forgiveness very attractive, 
at least from the perspective of the wrongdoer, but perhaps less appealing 
and ultimately very difficult to achieve for most potential forgivers. An act 
of genuine forgiveness becomes a rare event. Or philosophers could view 
these instances disjunctively: to forgive is either to overcome angry feelings 
or to accept an apology or to stop holding the wrong against the wrongdoer, 
etc. Certainly, there are significant points of overlap between no longer be-
ing angry, for example, and viewing someone differently. Seeing someone 
as improved or reformed naturally lessens the victim’s anger toward him or 
her. Perhaps the very best cases of forgiveness manage to achieve all of these 
conditions, but each on its own represents a minimal threshold for what might 
count as forgiveness.10 And finally, there is a third option: one might accept 
all of these as examples of everyday, pre-theoretical use of the word “forgive-
ness” but argue that only one represents a genuinely reflective understanding 
of the concept. For the most part, philosophers of forgiveness have opted for 
the third strategy, arguing that whatever else a single act of forgiveness might 
entail, it necessarily involves the victim overcoming his or her resentment, 
moral anger, or other retributive emotions.11
I have argued elsewhere for a broad understanding of forgiveness, claiming 
that a philosophical account should reflect and clarify recognizable everyday 
forgiving practices, even if these are not uncomplicated—especially if we 
wish to pay due respect to the narratives, responses, and self-understandings 
of victims.12 A philosophical account should distill those features and func-
tions that are central to the concept as it emerges from everyday practices and 
develop a rational or regulative ideal that best reflects them. If these cannot 
be unified into a single, universal paradigm, it is better to sit with complexity 
than to deny the phenomenology of moral experience. Examining practices 
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of forgiveness reveals an overlapping set of personal reactions to wrong-
ful harm, typically characterized by certain changes in attitude, perception, 
and behavior and perhaps by the uttering of certain phrases. These reactions 
presuppose some confrontation with the wrong as a wrong, and they are 
grounded in ethical reasons. What these different phenomena have in com-
mon are their intended function(s). They all intend a certain transformation 
in relation to the wrong and wrongdoer: to release the wrongdoer from his 
or her wrong in some way, to repair some of the damage done to all parties 
by the wrong—perhaps even to reconcile with him or her, reaffirming an old 
relationship—or simply to offer some relief from the subjective experience 
of guilt. Identifying acts of forgiveness by their intended function means we 
must pay attention to how the concept is used by those in situ.13 It is not some-
thing we can determine in advance any more than a disinterested observer 
can catch every gesture of love or apology, distrust or gratitude as they pass 
between intimates.
For my present purposes, however, I am prepared to remain relatively 
agnostic about the precise nature of forgiveness. We have good reason to 
embrace the possibility of nonvictim forgiveness, I claim, whether forgive-
ness is conceived primarily as a change in reactive attitudes (overcoming 
resentment) or outlined according to a more complex account. Moreover, 
proponents of narrow and wide accounts of forgiveness can at least agree that 
forgiveness is a personal reaction to wrongful harm; it differs, for example, 
from official, institutional responses like pardon or amnesty. The ability to 
pardon or grant amnesty depends upon political or judicial authority (and the 
power to wield it). Forgiveness does not depend on institutional support.
What then grounds or grants the ability to forgive? Philosophers have been 
quick to answer: victimization. The victim is the only individual whose per-
sonal connection to the harm is such that he or she is in a position to forgive 
it: “who suffers the harm . . . is in a position to grant or refuse” it.14 Jeffrie 
Murphy and Joram Haber agree that forgiveness actually belongs to the vic-
tim’s agency.15 Trudy Govier calls it “the victim’s prerogative,” Piers Benn 
describes an entitlement analogous to waiving one’s debts, and H. J. N. Hors-
brugh argues that even the verb “to forgive” takes into account whether one 
has sustained a serious injury.16 Agreement on this point is so widespread, it is 
treated almost as a truism: victims forgive.17 Many formulations of the ques-
tion of third-party forgiveness, moreover, tend to beg the question against it: 
to ask whether a third-party can forgive on behalf of the victim is to suggest 
that all forgiveness is already in some way victim’s forgiveness.
As with many apparent truisms, the content of this claim warrants some 
conceptual unpacking. Just what does it mean to claim that only victims can 
forgive? If most philosophers take forgiveness to be the effort to overcome 
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anger, resentment, and hostility for moral reasons, then this is surely a task 
that can be undertaken by others besides the primary victim of wrong.18 In 
my initial example, Robert’s friend Lilly struggled to overcome her anger 
and blame toward his teacher, Sophia, even though she was not the target 
of Sophia’s punishments. Similarly, it seems that Lilly came to see Sophia 
differently after Robert’s death, that she stopped holding Robert’s death 
against Sophia and that the two came to achieve some kind of reconciliation. 
Furthermore, her actions appear to also have had the functions I attributed to 
forgiveness: releasing Sophia from her guilt, repairing some—though sadly 
not all—of the damage done, and assisting in reconciliation. In the following 
section, I suspend philosophical skepticism about third-party forgiveness and 
ask, what would it mean to take Lilly’s actions for what they seem to be? 
How might we account for them as instances of third-party forgiveness?
FORGIVING AS A THIRD PARTY
What does it mean to forgive as a third party and not as the victim of a par-
ticular wrongdoing? I have claimed that forgiveness is a personal reaction 
to wrongful harm; that is, if my capacity to forgive depends upon some fact 
about me in particular, that fact will be some personal relationship to the 
wrongdoing—some reason I have to take the wrongdoing personally—and 
not some power or authority I possess antecedently and independently of 
the wrong. This is one difference between forgiveness and a restricted per-
formative power such as a presidential pardon. President Obama’s power to 
issue pardons does not depend on the reasons he may have for doing so in 
any given case. He may be criticized for pardoning without reason or for bad 
reasons, but the pardon is not undone by the mere existence of bad reasons. 
In the case of forgiveness, whether or not I am in a position to forgive (or not 
forgive) any given wrong—what Glen Pettigrove refers to as the “standing to 
forgive”—appears to depend upon the circumstances that have drawn me into 
this predicament in the first place. This is partly why Claudia Card refers to 
forgiveness as a “moral power” held by some and not others.19
Suppose we accept that not everyone can forgive every wrong, that the 
capacity to forgive a given wrong is not universal but limited to those with 
personal connections to the act requiring forgiveness. We need not conclude 
that only victims can manifest an appropriately personal relationship of the 
kind needed. My personal connection to the wrong can be indirect; I may be 
drawn in and provided with reasons to take it personally, based not on my re-
lationship to the act but my relationship to one of the primary actors. In other 
words, the personal quality of some connections possesses a kind of limited 
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transitivity; the personal nature of my connection to V (the victim) also pro-
vides me with a (fainter) personal connection to W, the wrongdoing, which 
V has tremendous reason to take personally.20 Insofar as my relationship to V 
and V’s relationship to W are appropriately grounded (more on that shortly), 
my attempts to forgive or my refusals to do so are also legitimate—though 
whether or not they are virtuous remains an open question in need of further 
assessment, just as it does for individual cases of victim’s forgiveness.
Third-party forgiveness rests on a personal but indirect relationship to 
the wrong. Indeed, this indirectness is precisely what distinguishes it from 
secondary or tertiary victim’s forgiveness, even though the same person 
may be in a position to forgive both as secondary victim and as a relevantly 
connected third party (such as Lilly, who is a friend to Robert and a former 
student of Sophia’s).21 It also explains why third-party forgiveness is not 
necessarily a substitute or surrogate for victim’s forgiveness. In forgiving as 
a third party, I do not forgive on behalf of the victim: I forgive alongside her 
or when she does not. Surrogate relationships aim, as much as possible, to 
reproduce the original; the more they approximate it, the more successful the 
surrogacy. But the successful third-party forgiver does not attempt to imitate 
or assume the victim’s role. He or she does not believe him- or herself to be 
the victim of wrong, and neither does he or she aim to forgive as the victim 
or even on behalf of the victim. Instead he or she offers his or her own for-
giveness as an addition or an alternative.22 As I established earlier, if forgive-
ness is a personal reaction and if many acts of wrongdoing have multiple 
victims, then we already know that one person’s forgiveness need not be a 
substitute for another’s (at least in theory) long before we invoke the specter 
of third-party forgiveness. Decisions to forgive or to refuse forgiveness can 
be enacted again and again.
So what sort of connection provides the “appropriate grounding” for as-
piring third-party forgivers? Put differently, when we can we trust in the 
appearance of transitivity? It is instructive first to examine acts of apparent 
third-party forgiveness that fail to be so grounded.
After all, I was uneasy with the unsolicited tide of forgiveness that washed over 
the shipwreck of our family in the wake of Thursday. In addition to mail promis-
ing either to beat his brains out or to bear his babies, Kevin has received dozens 
of letters offering to share his pain, apologizing for society’s having failed to 
recognize his spiritual distress and granting him blanket moral amnesty for what 
he has yet to regret.23
Eva Katchadourian is right to be uncomfortable with such random acts of 
“blanket” forgiveness. These (possibly) well-meaning strangers have missed 
the central point: they have jumped past the personal and the particular in 
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their “cheap . . . preening” and “conspicuous clemency.” Those who offer 
blanket forgiveness by e-mail do not understand the import of what Kevin 
did in the way that his victims did, their mothers Mary Woolford and Carol 
Reeves do, or even as his own mother does. The problem with “cheap” 
forgiveness from strangers is that it is ignorant, unthinking, and—most of 
all—uninvolved: “After reading a few pages from the merciful, I’d feel as if 
I’d just crawled from a vat of liquefied squash. I wanted to shake these people 
and scream, Forgive us! Do you know what he did?”24
But now consider Eva’s personal encounter with a stranger’s forgiveness 
earlier in the novel. She is waiting to visit her son in juvenile prison and 
finds herself in conversation with another mother, Loretta Greenleaf, who is 
also waiting: “we shared a sympathetic look, mutually marveling that kids 
who commit grown-up crimes still have their little-boy sweet tooth.”25 Once 
Loretta realizes Eva is the mother of the infamous “K. K.,” however, the 
tone shifts with a quick intake of breath. “I could hear the reels in her head 
rewinding, as she grasped frantically after everything I’d said, to which she’d 
only half listened.”26 There is silence and sudden, cold, even judgmental awk-
wardness. Loretta moves subtly away, but then the conversation continues. 
Eventually, she asks the familiar question: why? Eva snaps her response: “‘I 
expect it is my fault,’ I said defiantly. ‘I wasn’t a very good mother—cold, 
judgmental, selfish. Though you can’t say I haven’t paid the price.’”27 Loretta 
is silent, judging. And then, surprisingly, Eva is granted a reprieve.
It hard to be a momma. Nobody ever pass a law say ’fore you get pregnant you 
gotta be perfect. I’m sure you try the best you could. You here, in this dump, on 
a nice Saturday afternoon? You still trying. No you take care of yourself, honey. 
And you don’t be talking any more a that nonsense.
Loretta Greenleaf held my hand and squeezed it. My eyes sprang hot. I 
squeezed her hand back, so hard and so long that she must have feared I might 
never let go.28
Let us outline the details of this encounter. First of all, Loretta’s actions are 
reasonably described as forgiving: her stance toward Eva shifts from nega-
tive judgment to sudden and spontaneous comfort; her words offer Eva relief 
and (temporary) release from her crushing guilt, and they repair the initial 
solidarity the two shared. Loretta does not say “I forgive you,” but her ges-
ture speaks volumes regarding her attitudinal and cognitive shift. Of course, 
Loretta’s forgiveness is not directed at Kevin and his crimes, but at Eva and 
her self-attributed role in making Kevin the monster most people (including 
Eva herself) think that he is.
Loretta Greenleaf is not a victim of Kevin’s crimes or of Eva’s purported 
failures: not primary, secondary, or tertiary. Her only connection to both is 
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the long, humiliating wait to see their children and the guilty bewilderment 
she and Eva share at why they are there and how they might have failed as 
parents. Her involvement emerges from solidarity with Eva and from per-
sonal sympathy. We are also given evidence that her forgiveness is preceded 
by some imaginative effort to conceive of just what is at stake, both in her 
“frantic” grasping and her eventual question. We see her struggle with the im-
port of what she has just learned and her initial desire to physically separate 
herself. Her subsequent gesture of forgiveness does not appear cheap or prun-
ing or resemble a “vat of liquefied squash.” It is compassionate, generous, 
and knowing—Loretta does not absolve Eva by dismissing her responsibility 
for Kevin’s behavior altogether, but she offers much-needed comfort.
Can we identify the key difference between Loretta’s and Lilly’s actions 
and the letters from strangers? Both Loretta and Lilly knew something of the 
situation before they spoke. Lilly knew firsthand what Robert’s experience 
was, while Loretta’s experiences helped her to imagine what Eva’s might 
have been. In Lilly’s case, she was careful not to speak as Robert, although 
he represented her connection to Sophia and Sophia’s actions. In Loretta’s 
case, she drew on the partial identification she and Eva share without claim-
ing Eva’s experience for her own. Lilly found herself drawn in through a 
relationship of care for Robert and Loretta was connected through one of 
identification with Eva.
Yet these relationships, described externally, are not yet sufficient to 
ground Lilly and Loretta’s forgiveness appropriately. Some imaginative ef-
fort is involved. We can imagine someone else in the waiting room with just 
as many reasons to identify with Eva, but whose capacity or willingness to 
engage empathetically is nonexistent. This other person might say, “Don’t 
worry about it” or “get over it” or “it’s not your fault” automatically, in order 
to distance herself from Eva, to avoid rather than establish connection, and 
thus to alleviate her own discomfort with the encounter. In so doing, this 
imagined interlocutor would resemble the anonymous purveyors of blanket 
forgiveness via mail—as would a different student of Sophia’s, if that student 
was concerned only to divest Sophia of blame or to end an embarrassing 
emotional encounter with a teacher.
Both Loretta and Lilly take time before forgiving: for Lilly, this is a mat-
ter of months, while Loretta moves away for only a moment. But that space 
of time is suggestive; their subsequent words indicate that they have done 
reflective work to get to the forgiveness they express. Insofar as they possess 
credit as forgivers, both have done something to earn that credit. The content 
of Lilly’s work is explained to us in her own words; she had to learn to see 
things from Robert’s perspective, to understand his side of the conversations. 
Loretta’s work is left to the reader’s imagination, but it is not hard to read 
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into her subtle move away from Eva, the question she couldn’t avoid asking, 
and her warm and direct generosity to Eva’s breakdown. She goes from be-
ing unable to imagine how a creature like Kevin could be possible (“Why?”) 
to seeing only too well how he came to be—and perhaps how he could have 
come to be in her own home. This reflective work gives them insight into 
Sophia’s and Eva’s plights that, arguably, Sophia and Eva themselves do not 
possess (given their understandable guilt).
We might generalize from Loretta and Lilly to describe (one) avenue to 
third-party forgiveness. A successful third-party forgiver is committed to the 
moral interests of the victim and wrongdoer, that is, to getting the decision 
whether to forgive “right” and, at the same time, demonstrates some deference 
to the victim or wrongdoer’s own understanding of those interests, even if that 
understanding ultimately diverges from the forgiver’s own.29 Yet this combina-
tion of commitment and deference cannot be automatic and unthinking if we 
are to avoid the “vat of liquefied squash” Eva warns against; some work is 
required, and this work is best described as imaginative sympathy. The success-
ful third-party forgiver engages in an experience that David Velleman describes 
as the following: she “imagin[es] the world as experienced by him—as seen 
through his eyes and traveled in his shoes” if only for a moment.30
Adam Smith famously describes imaginative sympathy as taking place in 
two stages: first, we “enter as it were into [the other’s] body, and become 
in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of 
his sensations” and then we bring these same feelings “home to ourselves,” 
adopting and “[making] them our own.”31 The experience of “Smithean” 
sympathy is not literally to feel the other’s pain; after all, we sometimes feel 
for another “a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; 
because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast 
from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality.”32 Rather, 
it is to experience pain that arises from our attempt to view the world from 
the other’s perspective, and our subsequent effort to bring that perspective 
“home”—to understand and experience it as our own. In sympathizing—at 
least, in the imaginative sense Velleman and Smith describe—I thus align 
myself both what I understand to be the other person’s interests and what I 
imagine to be his or her perspective.33 But I do both with the understanding 
that they are his or hers and not mine; I do not confuse the two.
Needless to say, such imaginative exercises are fallible, to say the least, 
and are also asymptotic at best. The Lillys and Lorettas of the world can-
not ever experience exactly what Sophia and Eva feel, let alone understand 
what it is to be Robert, in Lilly’s case, or Mary Woolford, in Loretta’s. To 
imagine otherwise is hubris, and the temptation it presents—to presume more 
knowledge than can really be gained from an imaginative exercise and then 
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to offer forgiveness on the basis of that presumed knowledge—represents a 
significant moral risk.34
In Lilly’s case, the risks are minimal. From what we are told of Robert, 
it seems he would appreciate her efforts, whatever nuances or details she 
missed. But things are not so simple in the example of Loretta. After all, her 
empathetic connection is with Eva and not with Kevin’s victims. How then 
is her exercise sensitive to their needs, voices, and perspectives? To answer 
this, we must consider with what Loretta engages: that is, the attitudes and 
understandings expressed by Eva.
Eva is by no means a perfectly contrite wrongdoer. She is bitter (“you can’t 
say I haven’t paid the price”), wary, and defiant and is still working through 
what it means to be the mother of Kevin. Indeed, the novel’s narrative itself 
functions as her bewildered and horrified confession of ambivalence. But 
what Loretta recognizes and finds familiar in Eva’s anger is its self-directed-
ness. Ultimately, Eva is as unrelentingly in her self-condemnation as Mary 
Woolford is in her attacks on Eva—indeed, she shares Mary Woolford’s 
appraisal. Furthermore, Eva is all too aware of how her actions may have 
affected Kevin’s development, and she is consumed by her own shame and 
regret. When Loretta places herself imaginatively in the shoes of a wrong-
doer, she engages with a wrongdoer who has already taken on the victims’ 
assessments and perspectives on her wrongdoing and who cycles endlessly 
through the subsequent guilt and self-recrimination. Loretta’s task might be 
significantly more challenging were she to engage imaginatively with a care-
less and unrepentant wrongdoer in denial about their culpability (and thus 
their moral interests and obligations). It is highly unlikely that exercise would 
end in forgiveness if, as I have stipulated, the third party is committed to the 
moral interests of the wrongdoer. As things stand, Loretta offers Eva relief 
that Eva is not prepared to grant herself.
The multiple connection grounding a potential third-party forgiver to the 
wrong he or she would forgive is perhaps best described as moral solidarity, 
a term I borrow from Jean Harvey.35 Many examples of moral solidarity are 
found in individual intimate relationships. Family and friends of the victim 
and wrongdoer may be best placed to listen and to gauge appropriate reac-
tions: one person comes to forgive another for what he or she did to a third, 
through the forgiver’s caring relationships to both victim and wrongdoer, 
and his or her empathetic reconstruction of both people’s experiences. But 
relations of moral solidarity may also be built through common experience. 
Eva meets Loretta in the waiting room of the juvenile detention center. Only 
Eva is mother to a so-called monster, but both of them have been externally 
branded as parental failures. The notion of moral solidarity is equally fruit-
ful when applied to allegiances that are formed through shared social and 
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political identifications: that is, when those involved share meaningful group 
identities, especially when these identities are partly responsible for their 
vulnerability to harm. I think here of those who face social exclusion and 
violence, particularly members of minority groups and those who have expe-
rienced or witnessed hate crimes. In her psychological studies of forgiveness, 
Sharon Lamb focuses on female survivors of sexual abuse and violence; her 
empirical research suggests that most often decisions to forgive or to refuse 
forgiveness are grounded in a sense of solidarity with others in the same 
situation.36 For those who are socialized to discount their own subjectivity 
and individual value, it may be easier to confront shared wrongs indirectly, 
through sympathetic identification with other victims.37
THE VALUE OF THIRD-PARTY FORGIVENESS
Thus far I have outlined the features of successful instances of third-party 
forgiveness, emphasizing its double grounding in imaginative sympathy and 
transitive personal relations of identification and care. In this section, I argue 
that acknowledging the existence and value of third-party forgiveness leads 
us to subtler and more attentive assessments of the aftermath of wrong.
First, third-party forgiveness is occasionally the only forgiveness left to 
those carrying guilt. Consider, for example, the effect of Lilly’s note on So-
phia: Sophia had been carrying a terrible burden—arguably heavier than she 
deserved. She was plagued by doubts about her own teaching style and its ef-
fects on Robert, and this guilt even manifested itself in dreams of accusation 
and condemnation. She held herself responsible for his alienation and failure. 
Sophia had taught many other students, many who succeeded admirably and 
many who adore her; in feeling guilty, she wasn’t craving general affirmation 
of her teaching style or her moral worth. Rather, she wanted something very 
specific in relation to her actions toward Robert: she wanted to be forgiven 
for those deeds in particular, but Robert himself was dead and could no longer 
forgive her. In the radio interview, his friend Lilly says she is not even sure 
Robert would ever have written such a note, even though he held the beliefs 
and sentiments expressed in it. But a note from Lilly about Robert offered So-
phia what it was she wanted and, it appears, what Robert would have wanted 
for her. It may even have allowed Sophia to forgive herself.
Second, in theorizing about wrongdoing and the repair that follows it, 
there is a tendency to schematize the players and relationships involved: X 
the victim forgives Y the wrongdoer for Z the wrong committed. Such an 
idealization, while perhaps necessary, fails to acknowledge the important 
roles played by witnesses, bystanders, beneficiaries, and others who stand in 
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solidarity with the primary victim—or the primary perpetrator. The roles and 
relationships we take on are often complicated and overlapping. If we under-
stand forgiveness as the personal reaction appropriately grounded in moral 
reason that leads to a transformative release from guilt, then it is not always 
clear we can know from where or from whom such forgiveness will come. 
In the case of Robert and Sophia, it could not come from Robert because he 
was dead, but there are other instances in which a third party might be called 
upon to step in. We forgive agents for particular acts they have committed, 
but in many cases isolated incidents of wrongdoing take place in the context 
of an ongoing interpersonal relationship, which in turn takes place against a 
broader background of social and political power dynamics. In very few of 
such complex scenarios are the parties involved easily identified as “victim” 
or “wrongdoer” in general, but only in relation to a particular act. As a result, 
there are often cases in which the victim of a discrete wrong is more danger-
ous to the wrongdoer than vice versa. Here the role of appropriately situated 
third parties becomes even more important.
Forgiveness has multiple functions in the aftermath of wrongdoing: I 
categorized these as release, relief, and repair. Forgiveness can bring peace 
of mind to the victim, to the wrongdoer, or both; it can reaffirm values of 
trust, compassion, and goodwill; and it can function as an important epis-
temological reassessment of our initial attitudes to moral wrongdoers. Thus 
forgiveness can be a good—something sought by either party, and with good 
reason—when further relations between them, even the minimal contact 
needed to communicate or instantiate forgiveness, is not a wise or a safe idea. 
In these instances and in others, the forgiveness of third parties may take on 
a comforting or supportive role. We can certainly imagine another, happier 
scenario for Robert in which his struggles and choices do not have the same 
consequences. He leaves school, hits bottom, pulls himself together, and de-
cides to come back. In this alternate scenario, Lilly still finds herself handing 
Sophia a note because Robert is too shy or too afraid to do so himself. The 
forgiveness Sophia receives from Lilly might, in this case, be the first step 
to a mutual reconciliation and release from the past for all parties concerned.
By ignoring the multiple roles played by forgiveness and the multiple players 
capable of stepping in to enact it, the philosophical literature has tended for the 
most part to advocate what Sharon Lamb calls “a hyper-individualized notion 
of personal harm.”38 Some have accepted this notion as a natural consequence 
of “common sense” moral individualism.39 But as Lamb notes in her empirical 
work on forgiveness, such an approach ignores the role of group identities and 
identifications in situations of trauma and harms: it mattered that Lilly was also 
a student of Sophia’s, that she had witnessed Sophia’s relationship to Robert 
and her treatment of him, that Lilly was Robert’s best friend. Lilly was impli-
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cated and engaged in the situation as a participant, if not as a victim. If we treat 
“hyper-individualized” paradigms as normative frameworks for evaluating 
more complicated moral experience, such as those of Sophia, Lilly, and Robert, 
we risk distorting moral reality. As Govier and Verwoerd write, “forgiveness 
has an implicitly communal dimension . . . the relationship between the primary 
victim and the wrongdoer is not the only pertinent one.”40 Accepting that for-
giveness, as one potential strategy for coping with harm, is available to others 
beyond the primary victim of wrongdoing gives us a more accurate understand-
ing of the relational nature of both harm and its repair.
Third and finally, one of the most important reasons to recognize third-
party forgiveness is so that we can appropriately acknowledge the weight and 
value of its refusal. As Card notes, “refusal to forgive is equally an exercise 
of power.”41 Much attention has been paid to the issue of forgiveness in situa-
tions of damaged self-respect. Murphy has argued that given the value of self-
respect, the virtues of forgiveness have been overemphasized, and the virtues 
of maintaining anger and resentment underappreciated.42 We are in danger of 
promoting forgiveness to the point of servility, he maintains. While I am less 
fearful than Murphy of the dangers of forgiving, here he makes a valuable 
point. If a serial wrongdoer is forgiven again and again by a too-willing vic-
tim, appropriately grounded third-party refusals to forgive can be important 
demands that the wrongdoer be held accountable, that his or her actions be 
taken seriously, and that moral values be respected.43 When victims are co-
erced into forgiveness and reconciliation by abuse and oppression, third-party 
refusals are a particularly significant gesture of solidarity with the victim’s 
actual moral interests. But if we deny that such third parties could have for-
given at all, the gesture loses much of its power. For someone’s refusal to act 
to be significant, it must be the case that he or she could have acted should 
he or she have chosen. To paraphrase Hume: in this case the need to insist on 
“ought not” requires we acknowledge “could have.”
ONLY VICTIMS: THE CASE  
AGAINST THIRD-PARTY FORGIVENESS
In light of (what I take to be) the compelling case for third-party forgiveness, 
why do so many philosophers remain skeptical? Buried in the claim “only 
victims forgive” are two different arguments against third-party forgiveness: 
one is conceptual and the other moral.
The conceptual case against third-party forgiveness stipulates that, for ex-
ample, whether or not Lilly did the right thing in writing her note to Sophia, 
what she did simply was not forgiveness. While it is perfectly possible to sim-
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ply draw the line here (forgiveness just is what only victims do), proponents 
of this argument must take on the burden of explaining just what is happening 
if not third-party forgiveness because third parties do use words, gestures, and 
behaviors that are relevantly similar to victims’ forgiveness and appear to have 
similar moral and emotional effects. One approach is to argue that third parties 
are employing a figure of speech—just as we do when we declare a current 
or historical event to be “unforgivable” as a measure of extreme and heinous 
wrongdoing, without seriously entertaining the decision whether to forgive or 
even the thought that my forgiveness is in question, or when we describe a mi-
nor oversight as “forgivable” to emphasize its moral unimportance.
Yet many third-party efforts to forgive go beyond measures of wrongful-
ness. Imagine, for instance, that Lilly were to say: “I tried to forgive Sophia 
for what she did to Robert, but I just couldn’t do it” or, as was the case, “I 
was astonished, after writing the note, to realize I really had forgiven Sophia 
for what she did to Robert.” More than a figure of speech is at stake. We 
can hear the effort expended in her words and recognize the disappointing 
conclusion in the first case and the optimism in the second. Furthermore, 
the figurative account seems limited to acts of verbal or articulated acts of 
forgiveness: it seems nonsensical to claim that I have figuratively overcome 
my anger or hypothetically come to see someone differently. Moreover, if all 
forgiveness utterances by third parties were purely figurative, there would 
be no sense in which some parties are in a comparatively better position to 
forgive than others or have better grounds for doing so. Yet it matters to the 
story that Lilly was a student of Sophia’s, that she was Robert’s best friend. 
Lilly felt called upon to forgive in a way that a less connected witness might 
not. Indeed, someone else who performed the very same action might have 
appeared presumptive or arrogant to Sophia and would thus fail to grant her 
the release she welcomed from Lilly. As I argued earlier, Lilly is appropri-
ately able to offer the note because she is personally connected to the wrong 
in a way that others are not.
But perhaps I have underplayed Lilly’s connection to the tragedy. Is Lilly 
able to forgive only because she is also a victim? Trudy Govier and Wilhelm 
Verwoerd argue that apparent cases of third-party forgiveness are actually 
forgiveness by secondary or tertiary victims. For example, while Kevin’s 
classmates and teacher were his direct targets, he also caused unthinkable 
distress to their parents, family, and friends (his secondary victims) and to 
the wider community (his tertiary victims). Eva marvels at the forgiveness 
offered by some parents:
Honestly, when Carol Reeves formally “forgave” our son on CNN for murder-
ing her boy, Jeffrey, who was already precocious enough at the classical guitar 
to be courted by Julliard, I had no idea what she was talking about.44
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Equally, Eva blankly accepts the condemnation of others like Mary Wool-
ford, who break her eggs in the supermarket, paint her house crimson, and 
attack her publicly and legally.45 Both Carol Reeves and Mary Woolford are 
secondary victims of Kevin’s violence, even if they were not present in the 
gymnasium; and because they have this status, their deciding that they are 
entitled to decide whether to forgive can be understood without the need to 
invoke third-party forgiveness at all. It only requires that we acknowledge 
they are two of many victims.
I believe it to be a serious mistake to assume that every time someone 
forgives, he or she does so out of a sense of victimization; that is, that we 
forgive only to the extent that we ourselves have been harmed and only for 
whatever and however we have been harmed, even if that harm comes in the 
form of injury to someone else we care about. This confuses the object of ev-
ery third party’s concern. Indeed, part of why it is important to acknowledge 
third-party forgiveness as a distinct phenomenon is so we can recognize those 
cases in which, in forgiving, the forgiver does not focus—and does not want 
to focus—on his or her own, secondary distress. Consider two statements 
Lilly might have uttered to Sophia: “I do/do not forgive you for taking Robert 
from me” or “I do/do not forgive you for what you did to Robert.” The differ-
ence is not merely a matter of phrasing: Lilly spoke to Sophia about Robert’s 
experience of Sophia, not her own experience of Robert’s loss; the story is 
not about Lilly blaming and then forgiving Sophia for taking Robert away. 
Just as we may have genuine desires and wishes for others’ well-being—for 
their sakes and not for our own—so too may we take up the question of their 
wrongful distress and feel this personally, for their sakes and not for our own. 
When I engage in imaginative sympathy as Adam Smith describes it, my feel-
ing distress for another’s sake is not reducible to my feeling his or her distress 
as he or she would feel it, namely, feeling the distress of someone who takes 
him- or herself to have been victimized. Rather, the focus of my attitude is 
outward on how things are for her. I am not the object of my own concern.
By collapsing any experience of forgiveness into a victims’ experience, we 
fail to distinguish being personally affected—for someone else’s sake—from 
being victimized, and thus appropriate an experience that belongs to victims 
alone. If we have reason to be wary of any extension of the prerogative to 
forgive, surely we have at least as many if not more reasons to be wary of ex-
tending the title “victim.” As Kathryn Norlock notes, this approach also fails 
to respect the distinct moral agency of the third party properly.46 Lilly was 
clear in her interview and to Sophia that her own reactions had differed from 
Robert’s; in fact, she had learned from him. She was not forgiving Sophia for 
herself, but offering something to Sophia about and from Robert. In order to 
recognize and respect the agency of victims and of third parties properly, we 
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need an account of third-party forgiveness claims that recognize our ability to 
respond to the distress of others deeply and personally without appropriating 
it as our own.
At root, the most credible case against third-party forgiveness is the moral 
argument: third parties can, but ought not, engage in decisions to forgive. 
This injunction against third-party forgiveness is motivated by a desire to 
respect the victim’s own unique and painful relationship to the wrongdoing; 
it rests on an intuition that forgiveness of a wrong is one of the few powers 
remaining to the victim, and that its power depends on its exclusivity. I agree 
that it is morally important that no one else can forgive for the victim, that 
the power to forgive cannot be snatched away like some ethical power of 
attorney.
But because forgiveness is a personal reaction to wrongdoing, there is 
no reason why several persons cannot take it upon themselves to offer or 
refuse forgiveness. This is uncontroversially true in situations of multiple 
victims, for example. Kevin Katchadourian murders seven fellow students 
and a teacher; the ramifications of each death spread outward through the 
entire community. Some parents find themselves forgiving Kevin while oth-
ers do not. It is not a contradiction to say that Kevin is both forgiven and 
unforgiven.47 But then, just as a single wrongdoer can be both forgiven and 
unforgiven if his or her act had many victims, there seems to be conceptual 
and moral room for him or her to be both forgiven by the victim and unfor-
given by relevantly connected third parties, or vice versa. The possibility of 
diverging attitudes to forgiveness and diverging decisions to forgive exist 
even without third-party forgiveness: two or more victims might hold such 
diverging positions.
Furthermore, there may be victim-centered reasons to advocate nonvic-
tims’ forgiveness. Third-party forgiveness is not always a rebuke to the vic-
tim. Sometimes it is in support or agreement with him or her, as appears to 
be the case with Robert and Lilly. Lilly’s forgiveness expresses and relates 
an understanding that Robert originally shared with her. In no sense is it a 
rebuke to Robert; she intends to defend and support him. Third parties can 
even reinforce a victim’s forgiveness with their own, in the face of commu-
nity disapproval: if Sophia’s entire class had turned against her, a gesture by 
Robert’s best friend would go some way toward restoring the peace. That 
a third party like Lilly is able to lift the burden of guilt is also particularly 
relevant when the victim is no longer capable of doing so, that is, when he or 
she is absent, incapacitated, or dead, as Robert was. Third parties may also 
step in when the victim is simply unable to comprehend the magnitude of his 
or her victimization (through shock or trauma, for example). Lilly’s act of 
forgiveness emerged from her investment in Robert’s wishes.
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Respecting another person does not always entail that we comply with 
his or her wishes or even remain silent about them. Sometimes respect for 
another’s moral agency requires that we communicate when and where he or 
she has gone wrong and attempt to provide a better example of moral action. 
Discussions of forgiveness tend to overly moralize the victim’s position; 
while bad things do happen to good people, they also happen to bad people—
or, more gently, to excessively angry, recalcitrant, or unforgiving people. 
Equally, while cruel and immoral people do bad things, so too do more or 
less good people in moments of weakness, anger, or confusion. It does not 
silence victims everywhere to admit that sometimes grudges are held too long 
and too cruelly any more than it does to acknowledge that the “victim” of one 
particular wrong may be, in the broader context, more perpetrator than victim. 
Finally, insisting on a strict victim’s prerogative to forgive would have the 
peculiar consequence of rendering unforgivable every infraction, however 
minor, against someone who is now deceased, incapacitated, or incorrigibly 
stubborn.48
The specific arguments against third-party forgiveness are perhaps more 
easily dismissed than the nagging worry behind them: fear of a blanket for-
giveness that is cheap and automatic, which skips past the painful and messy 
business of confronting viciousness and violence, and honoring the discom-
forting reactions of those who have been affected by it. If nonvictims cannot 
replicate the visceral, gut-wrenching experience of being intentionally vic-
timized, then they may be more likely to push for reconciliation, for the return 
of pleasantries and social harmony. They may try to forgive in the abstract, 
appealing to cheap truisms about human frailty rather than facing the stark 
reality of human violence, thus rendering their forgiveness morally inappro-
priate and even dangerous—and thus they sully the good name of (victim’s) 
forgiveness. And here I share the skeptic’s worry; our disagreement is over 
how best to address and account for this worry. I believe the solution lies in 
acknowledging and accounting for third-party acts, thus providing us with 
tools for parsing the better and the worse and for advocating better practices 
of third party acts and refusals.
VICTIMS’ AND NONVICTIMS’ FORGIVENESS
My purpose in this chapter has been to extend our understanding of forgive-
ness to others beside the victims of wrongdoing. I have argued that we can 
recognize a distinct variant of forgiveness, third-party forgiveness, which is 
appropriately grounded in an imaginatively engaged, caring relationship of 
moral solidarity. I have also argued that when we deny third-party forgive-
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ness, we misconstrue the nature of harm and wrongdoing; we overmoralize 
the victim’s position and overlook the complex roles played by witnesses and 
secondary participants.
Acknowledging a role for third-party forgiveness does not guarantee that 
all such acts are therefore morally best any more than the victim’s having the 
standing needed to forgive guarantees that all acts of victim’s forgiveness are 
therefore the morally best option. Third parties, like victims, face the risk of 
forgiving too easily or too often on the one hand, and of being too unforgiv-
ing on the other. Indeed, given the imaginative work needed to enter into the 
victim’s standpoint, third-party forgiveness holds particular moral risks that 
victims’ forgiveness does not. The indirectness of the personal connection 
increases the imaginative distance involved and so there is more danger of 
cheapening the act with “blanket amnesty.” Even the most careful philosophi-
cal accounts cannot protect against all hasty or misguided forgiveness, just as 
they cannot guard against recalcitrant resentment and grudges held too long. 
Yet insofar as they are appropriately grounded and cautiously bestowed, the 
work of third-party decisions to forgive contribute significantly to practices 
of post-conflict repair.49
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ment to the other’s interests and a willingness to engage, empathetically, with his or 
her experience and perspective of those interests. See Jean Harvey, “Moral Solidarity 
and Empathetic Understanding: The Moral Value and Scope of the Relationship,” 
Journal of Social Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2007): 22–37.
36. Sharon Lamb, “Forgiveness Therapy in Gendered Contexts: What Happens 
to the Truth?,” in Trauma, Truth and Reconciliation, ed. Nancy Potter (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 229–56.
37. I am prepared to extend instances of third-party forgiveness to those whose 
sole connection is imaginative; that is, to someone who forms a relationship to the 
primary victim based on his or her outrage and indignation at the victim’s plight. 
Glen Pettigrove describes someone whose outrage at the treatment of workers in 
the maquiladoras along the U.S-Mexican border leads her to become an activ-
ist and take up their cause, on behalf of “people she has never met and to whom 
she is connected by no more than their shared humanity.” See Pettigrove, “The 
Standing to Forgive,” 587. It seems possible that for some, shared humanity is 
enough to ground the kind of rich imaginative engagement required for moral 
solidarity; sadly, though, the imaginations of the rest of us are more limited. For 
us, such attempts may dissolve into the emotional equivalent of “liquefied squash” 
that Eva Katchadourian despises. I anticipate an inverse relationship between the 
strength of the existing external relationship and the kind of imaginative effort 
involved. Furthermore, given the limited nature of our imaginations, the dangers 
of “ungrounded” or illegitimate attempts to forgive as a third party increase as the 
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closeness of the relationship decreases. We can imagine difficult or “limit” cases, 
in which the desire to forgive emerges from a morbid or unhealthy fascination 
with wrongdoing: picture a television news junkie who craves stories of depravity, 
cruelty, and violence simply to imaginatively “enter into” the victims’ experiences 
and then forgive the perpetrators. It is not clear that anything of value is accom-
plished here—certainly not the kind of moral repair, relief, or release from guilt we 
typically associate with forgiveness. Many people intuitively resist this experience 
as forgiveness, out of the sense that insofar as imaginative work is being done, it 
is not the right sort of imaginative work. A (potential) forgiver should not, one 
presumes, go seeking or cause occasions on which it is warranted. On the other 
hand, the neurotic compulsion to forgive (and the craving for wrongdoing simply 
to induce forgiveness) is equally problematic for the moral value of victim’s for-
giveness.
38. Lamb, “Forgiveness Therapy in Gendered Contexts: What Happens to the 
Truth?,” 45.
39. Griswold, Forgiveness, 118.
40. Govier and Verwoerd, “Forgiveness: The Victim’s Prerogative,” 108.
41. Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil, 213.
42. Murphy, Getting Even.
43. It seems Shriver’s character Eva Katchadourian agrees with me here, when 
she remarks, “my brother Giles’ staunch incapacity to pardon us . . . is a grudge I 
treasure.” Shriver, We Need To Talk About Kevin, 328.
44. Ibid., 230.
45. Ibid., 3–6.
46. Norlock, Forgiveness from a Feminist Perspective, 115–36.
47. Though it may be fair to say that one act of forgiveness can preempt another, 
making the wrongdoer’s need for forgiveness less urgent. If eleven of my twelve 
victims have forgiven me, my quest to obtain forgiveness from the holdout may have 
less urgency than it did for the first. On the other hand, the holdout victim may come 
to have exaggerated importance for me, if I am wracked with guilt.
48. The character of Mr. Darcy initially makes an excellent example of a too 
stubborn, doggedly recalcitrant victim: “‘No’—said Darcy, ‘I have made no such 
pretension. I have faults enough, but they are not, I hope, of understanding. My tem-
per I dare not vouch for. It is, I believe, too little yielding—certainly too little for the 
convenience of the world. I cannot forget the follies and vices of others as soon as I 
ought, nor their offences against myself. My feelings are not puffed about with every 
attempt to move them. My temper would perhaps be called resentful.—My good 
opinion once lost, is lost forever.’” See Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (London: 
The Zodiac Press, 1950), 47.
49. The arguments in this chapter have taken some time to come to fruition, and I am 
grateful to the many, many people who challenged and improved them in their infancy. I 
wish to extend my thanks especially to Steven Burns, Daniel Groll, Duncan MacIntosh, 
Glenn Pettigrove, Linda Radzik, Greg Scherkoske, Susanne Sreedhar, and Lisa Tessman, 
for their assistance—and, above all, to Kate Norlock for her editorial guidance.
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